Strategically Speaking
Exit of a military dictator
THE fourth and one of the longest surviving military rulers in the sixty years of Pakistan's existence, has chosen to make an honourable" exit. Good sense has prevailed, and by choosing the path of least resistance Pervez Musharraf has spared his country political instability.
Regrettably, his departure validates the opinion that two very important factors, both of which have been key to Pakistan's existence as a state and formulation of its domestic and external policies, the army and the United States, continue to play a vital role in its politics.
It is only when he realised that the army's support was no longer guaranteed, that Musharraf chose to put in his papers. And there are grounds to believe that it was not a little US pressure which played a part in the decision making process of the army regarding its support to Musharraf.
Although Musharraf's departure has been a great relief for everyone in Pakistan, not least of all the army, yet it is a cause for concern to those in Pakistan committed to the flourishing of democratic culture and strengthening of the country's democratic institutions, that the army continues to play an active power broker role in Pakistan, and by all indications, will continue to do so in future.
Musharraf will perhaps go the way his predecessors have, to oblivion, unlamented and unremembered for the so called "good acts" that he is supposed to have done for his country during his nine-year rule.
These "good acts" are sheer illusions -- the dictators hardly comprehend the unmitigated damage they do to the national institutions. By the time the country recovers from the ill effects, it is time for another military man to emerge as Pakistan's "saviour." And the same story is repeated.
Musharraf had completed almost ten years of rule, most of it in uniform, a cycle that sits in the annals of Pakistan's history as a decadal phenomenon, proving once again that what goes round must come round.
The man he overthrew to capture power was instrumental in his exit, and may yet see to it that the ex-president is put in the dock for usurping power and other illegal acts. Who knows, Nawaz Sharif may well make Musharraf taste Arab hospitality, which he himself was forced to enjoy for ten years, courtesy Musharraf.
The consequences of military takeovers, or the aftermath of prolonged military rule, has been the singular most debilitating factor standing in the way of Pakistan's progress and the consummation of democracy in the country. (So has it been for Bangladesh.)
Unfortunately, the greater part of Pakistan's sixty years history is the story of military rule interspersed, as an interregnum, by democratic or quasi-democratic rule. And the periods of democratic rule were underwritten by the military with the pervasive influence of the ISI all too evident.
Musharraf's regime was termed as a period of "controlled democracy' guided by "enlightened moderation." Controlled democracy is an oxymoron, as made evident by the controversial redrafting of the constitution by Musharraf just prior to the 2002 election, giving the president unlimited power including the power to dismiss an elected parliament.
That was his idea of taking Pakistan down the path of democracy. And excesses and machinations to keep politics under his thumb defiled the notion of "enlightened moderation."
He started off as the "chief executive" and ended up as an arrogant and autocratic president. In his first address to the nation on October 17, 1999, he tried to assuage the people of Pakistan by saying that the dispensation he was heading was not martial law, only another road towards democracy. And like all military usurpers he said: "The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish."
The people of Pakistan are only too painfully aware of the nature of "true democracy." And when it is left to those wielding illegal power through coercion, the definition of "absolutely necessary" assumes unbound elasticity.
At the very seminal stages of his tenure Musharraf's Pakistan was almost sidelined -- having been castigated by the US for going nuclear, till 9/11 restored Pakistan's geopolitical clout. Pakistan became indispensable for the success of US operation in Afghanistan and indeed its so-called global war on terror.
For Pakistan, it was the second time that the Afghanistan situation resurrected its importance to the West, particularly the US -- the first time was when the Russian's invaded Afghanistan. According to one author, immediately after 9/11, "concern for the state of Pakistan's democracy melted away and the military government was hailed by the West as an "exemplary country in the fight against terrorism."
Musharraf claimed his policy was guided by the need to preserve Pakistan's national interest. But he had very little choice but to join Bush's war on terror, having been given little alternative when, on September 12, 2001, his chief spy Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, who was coincidentally in Washington when the twin towers were attacked, was very tersely conveyed the US "you are with us or against us" option by Richard Armitage, and later reinforced by Powell's telephonic message to the Pakistan president that the American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in this fight with the United States. And Pakistan was paid handsomely for this; among other things was the $12.5 billion debt rescheduling.
Unfortunately, his Afghan policy has not given Pakistan the dividend that Musharraf had expected. Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan is purely strategic, seen in terms of providing a strategic depth in the event of a war with India. That would require a pliant government in Kabul and prevention of Indian diplomatic foothold in Afghanistan. Neither has happened.
Neither has he been able to help US meet its objective in Afghanistan. Bin-Laden remains at large and his capacity to continue insurgency activities against the Nato forces unimpaired.
In fact, Musharraf had failed to meet most of the 7 requirements that the US had officially handed over to Pakistan on September 13, insofar as they related to anti-terror actions on the part of Pakistan.
The border belt is virtually a no-go area for Pak troops, the treaty with tribal leaders failed to prevent the use of Pakistan territory by the al-Qaeda fighters. His balancing act has rather helped the religious parties to gain a stronger foothold in Pakistan politics.
At home, his policies have spawned terrorism even more and his closeness to the US had made him unpopular at home and a terrorist's target. Much as the US may take comfort in the fact that Musharraf was a good friend of the US, a sentiment that was rearticulated by Condoleezza Rice after Musharraf departure, what the American administartion has failed to find out was whether the people of Pakistan have been equally well disposed to the US?
It has been a resounding victory for the people of Pakistan. Much would depend on how the two parties play their role in this critical moment. So far they have been seized with the issue of Musharraf.
The issue of terrorism and religious radicalism remain the major problem for Pakistan.
Now that they have seen to their "common opponent" it would do very little good to Pakistan if the leadership failed to realise that it is only a liberal and participatory democracy that can combat extermesim and terrorism effectively.
There are lessons for us too, and only those that will stop and ponder will internalise those. Military rule is never an option -- but as one eminent historian has said: "History repeats itself in the large because human nature changes with geological leisureliness."
Human nature and mindset must remain alive to the need of the time.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel.
Comments