Panorama

Hopes and fears in Pakistan

Dilara Choudhury
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf resigned on August 18 instead of facing the threatened impeachment. Had he been impeached, he would have been the first president of the country to meet such a fate. His resignation marks the end of an era when the army's role was critical. Musharraf was the fourth Pakistani general who seized power by overthrowing an elected government. Though he civilianised his rule through elections and party-building, he kept an iron grip over the affairs of the state with the support of military. The reaction in Pakistan has been one of jubilation. Hopes have been raised that the PML(N) and PPP will now work together to establish democratic rule and tackle the problems that have besieged the country. Musharraf, who had retained the power to dissolve the parliament, was considered to be an impediment in the functioning of democracy. The issue at stake was so important that the coalition government spent six months deciding what to do with Musharraf. Now that he is gone, an array of questions arises. Will there be functional democracy? Will the government be able to successfully tackle the pressing economic problems and growing militant threat in the north-west tribal areas, as well as rising militancy within the country? In the prevailing uncertainties, there is both hope and fear. A successful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy now depends on the PML(N) and PPP. In the past, both PPP and PML(N) were bitter foes, which gave the army leeway to impose its writ upon the country. Now, the army has distanced itself from politics because it knows that it is no longer popular with the people. But, in case the coalition government fails, an army take-over cannot be ruled out. This, and other factors, should ensure cooperation within the alliance. First, there seems to be a realisation in Nawaz and Zardari about their past mistakes, and both know that confrontation and animosity not only bring destruction to individual leadership but to the country as well. They know that the future of their leadership depends on the success of their government. The task is gargantuan due to the multifarious problems left behind by Musharraf. The delay in tackling pressing problems has made it even more difficult. Second is the security issue, which is equally important. Besides the economic issues, the coalition has to take the responsibility in curbing militancy in the border along Afghanistan and within the country. The coalition has to make sure that the military conducts its operations in the way the civilian government wants, rather than the way the military wants. The military's present campaign in Bajaur is its first credible assault on a Taliban stronghold since similar operations in 2007. But how far they can go depends on the government. Thus, the coalition partners know that unless they have a functional government the military questions will remain in the limbo. Third, the army question is critical. At present, the army is no longer popular with the people and should be willing to act under civilian control. In the present power vacuum, the army may act autonomously. This kind of situation must be brought under control. It is only a strong civilian government which can act in this regard. Fourth, another compulsion for cooperation is the alliance's endeavour to address Pakistan's relations with India. Having peace with India is as important as having peace in Pakistan. The alliance must work together in dealing with this critical issue. Although India was initially suspicious of Musharraf due to the Kargil incident, it became comfortable with dealing with him since 2004. It was even speculated that Musharraf and Manmohan Singh were trying to find a solution for Kashmir and even dreaming of winning the Nobel Peace Prize. It is ironical that India, though a democracy, finds it easier to deal with an army ruler than a weak civilian government. Right now India is uncomfortable, not knowing who to speak to with regard to security issues. The coalition, thus, needs to quickly put its house in order to deal with India. Lastly, the relationship with the US, Pakistan's strategic ally in the War on Terror, is another area that needs to be tackled through joint collaboration. It depended on Musharraf, who could never convince his countrymen that the war was needed not only for Washington but for Pakistan as well. Consequently, Musharraff was unable to deliver the goods. The alliance's task is to get peoples' support in this endeavour. Washington has indicated that it is looking forward to wider interaction with the civilian government, rather than depending on army rulers. The coalition, thus, has to redefine it relations with its most critical ally in the context of the changed scenario. The people of Pakistan are hopeful that Nawaz and Zardari can unhitch the country from the army's shadow and proceed towards the consolidation of democracy. However, there are a number of pitfalls. Though Nawaz and Zardari have compelling reasons to work together, there are still issues over which they have differences. The coalition is still very fragile, and, in May, it came close to splitting over the impeachment of Musharraf and the reinstatement of the judges who were sacked in 2007. These issues still haunt the alliance. Nawaz wants to reinstate them immediately, whereas Zardari wants to keep some judges, including the deposed Chief Justice Iftkhar Chaudry, out of the restoration deal. Zardari wants such a deal because he is apprehensive that Justice Chaudry may overturn a legal arrangement under which corruption charges against him were withdrawn. In the post-Musharraf period, Pakistan has a genuine chance for establishing a democratic order, but it is evident that the task ahead is fraught with difficulties. There are both hopes and fears, which is not unnatural. Usually, a country that remains under authoritarian rule for a long time fails to establish democratic culture and democratic institutions. The country concerned thus finds it hard to transcend from authoritarism to democracy. Only mature leadership can chart a course for a country in such unfriendly terrain. So, it is now up to the leadership of the country to decide whether or not Pakistan would follow a democratic path or slip back into chaos, inviting the army once again to rule.
Dilara Choudhury is Professor, Department of Government and Politics, Jahangirnagar University.