Trouble in paradise

Klaus Naumann
IT is obvious that, for mutual interest, Europe needs the US to be a global player and US needs Europe to sustain its global commitments. But, the future appears bleak, whether observing European sentiments at the mere mention of President Bush or comparing foreign-policy statements from US presidential hopefuls that include scant mention of Europe. The reason the partnership is in trouble is because of different perceptions and gaps in capabilities to approache global problems. The West has lost credibility in the world and many Europeans hold US government responsible for that. Europe's risk awareness is very different from that in US. While most in US believe in the global war on terror, Europe doesn't see itself as being at war. US begins to understand the new dimension of trans-national threats and while European experts agree with their American colleagues, the general public don't. Following a period of unilateralism, US might return to a new form of multilateralism but whatever the label, the net result for Europeans will be the same: They'll be called to take more responsibilities and show solidarity by risk-sharing without reservations. To avoid new disputes, both sides must consider the perceptions they have of each other. Europeans see US as prepared to use its overwhelming military power early in crisis. Indeed, the US often takes a robust approach -- although a growing number of Americans is aware that few future problems can be solved by such means. Americans overlook the diversity of Europe and tend to see Europeans' use of soft power, dialogue and international law as a fig leaf to hide a lack of resolve. Europe is more reluctant than US to use military power. Germany is, probably, most reluctant to use military power other than for homeland defence operations. Germany claims that any war of aggression must be banned and that it's extremely difficult to justify war as an instrument of politics. Most European governments must win parliamentary approval for any deployment in operations outside the country. This constitutes a major obstacle in any transatlantic consensus since US president can take advantage of the War Powers Act, whereas the allies must base their requests for approval on an international consensus. Moreover, many Europeans believe that most conflicts can be solved through dialogue, negotiation and compromise, reinforcing a European school of thought aiming at a total ban on war. But war is alive and well. Any claim otherwise was bombed into pieces when non-state actors using deadly instruments attacked the US on 9/11. Nevertheless, many Europeans believe that one can cope with the dangerous world by applying traditional legal instruments to protect a state's citizens. The US understands that new solutions are needed. But its initial steps suggested to the outside world that protection of American citizens took priority over customary international law. Consequently, two approaches have emerged from the transatlantic community: the legalistic approach and the protection-at-all-cost approach. The first approach has two ways of legalising the use of force -- self-defence and a UN Security Council resolution. While the proponents of the legalistic approach are right in principle, the question remains what to do if the UN Security Council cannot fulfil its duty, even though an overwhelming majority regards the use of force as legitimate. A strictly legalistic approach is therefore no longer appropriate. But to act with little or no respect for international law is no answer either since it ruins the credibility of the West's most powerful instrument: We stand for the rule of law and respect for human rights. But the challenges are too big, the reality too compelling, that we can afford being split by perceptions. There's but one way to respond, namely by standing together. Anything else signals that the West lacks the resolve to protect its way of life and values. There is also a substantial gap in military capabilities between Europeans and Americans. Information dominance matters today, but the Europeans spend more money on legacy forces and personnel: Europe's defence spending amounts to 60% of US defence spending, but Europe produces around 10% of US power projection capabilities. US will remain the leader in high-tech systems integration and exploring new domains such as nano-technology and bionics. However, whether the US will enjoy advantages in the emerging domain of cyber operations remains to be seen. The Chinese have taken the lead here and plan on acquiring a capability to paralyse a country without using any destructive power. The potential exists to simply switch off the most powerful military capabilities, in addition to paralysing any society. Another capability that matters is the political will to take unpopular decisions. Obviously, this is easier for a US or French president than it is for a German chancellor or other European heads of government who must form coalition governments, inadequate for responding to the security challenges of today. Turning public opinion around on controversial issues such as deploying forces in combat operations or on using all instruments of politics and tools in fighting terrorism is a demanding battle for politicians. Moreover, the historically well-founded desire of never again giving too much power to a centralised government produces additional impediments in quite a few countries. In conclusion, the West is in serious crisis, and Europeans lack what's needed most at the dawn of a new administration in Washington: European unity and the resolve to find with its US allies common approaches that coordinate all instruments of politics. There's urgent necessity to begin any process of shaping a new transatlantic relationship by sincerely discussing what divides Europe and the US and what keeps us together -- a step not taken since the uniting pressure during the Cold War withered away. Such a crisis of transatlantic relations is nothing new for Nato nations. Political leaders should take advantage of it and lay new foundations by moving to the bold vision of an alliance comprised of more than military precautions, prepared to use all instruments of politics in a comprehensive way, one that convinces citizens that preserving peace and protecting values and convictions are well worth the sacrifices.
Klaus Naumann is a German Army four-star general who served as Nato's highest ranking military officer during the Kosovo Air Campaign.
© Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. All rights reserved. Reprinted by arrangement.