Post Breakfast
Russia on the global stage
RECENT events in Georgia have persuaded the EU, the USA and other developed countries to re-assess their relations with Russia. Such an effort by the West is however being interpreted by Russia as another attempt to contain, rather than working with it as an emerging strategic partner. The current situation is complex to say the least. Russia believes it is acting responsibly to protect 'its citizens' in the Caucaus, whereas the international community appears to have shied away from any criticism of the Georgian regime which, according to Moscow, is failing to abide by international law or human rights norms.
The Russian Federation knows that events in Georgia have drawn world attention to the future role that Russia intends to play in Europe and on the global stage. Its leadership also realizes that the EU in particular is worried about its possible effect on European security. At the same time, Russia is also upset that recent developments in the Caucasus have demonstrated that most countries 'have either been incapable or unwilling to put pressure on Georgian President Mikeil Saakashvili to ensure that Tbilisi abides by international rules and human rights norms'. Russia has also been critical of the EU because the extraordinary meeting of the European Council avoided condemning the Georgian regime's actions and instead extended support to the "courageous little democracy" and its 'Rose Revolution.'
Russia believes that the recent crisis in the Caucasus has highlighted three negative trends in international relations: (a) one sided unilateralism, rather than multi-lateral diplomacy; (b) "remilitarisation," and (c) favouring the "correct" political elites. These premises have of course generated much controversy within the international community.
Russia believes that its reactions to the events in Georgia are based on Article 51 of the UN Charter (the right to individual self-defence in the face of armed attacks) and that the West appears to be taking an ideological approach, dividing the world into "friends" or "foes." In this context, Russia, on more than one occasion has expressed its concern not only about the way in which international relations are being "remilitarised," but also about the US' intention to deploy an anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe. Russia, in this regard has also clarified its disappointment that Kiev is being dragged into NATO to support the aim of trying to bring newly independent countries within the western sphere of influence.
Moscow, in its latest discussions with the French President (also currently President of the European Council) has also expressed its anxiety that rather than supporting the call for an arms embargo, the West - including EU Member States - is supplying the Georgian state with weapons. They have pointed out that this is in direct contravention of the EU Code of Conduct on the transfer of conventional weapons, which specifies that EU members should not supply arms to regimes in conflict or instability.
This tough Russian line is probably based on their assumption that the world is changing and the West now comprises less than 15 of the global population. Some Russian analysts have also suggested that Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that western attempts to associate progress with Western liberal democracy do not work.
Analysts are however not completely convinced about Russia claiming the higher moral ground. Some, like me have seen Georgian events as a response to what happened earlier in Kosovo. Others have also noted that the West might be using NATO to create fresh borders of Western civilisation, but Russia has also not been observing non-discriminatory rules of engagement in their governance of civilian ethnic minorities in that region. They have pointed out substantial differences in treatment of civilians in Chechnya, Dagestan and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The EU, quite obviously is wary about the evolving state of affairs. They want to promote a strategic EU-Russian relationship, but now find themselves in the sensitive situation of having to side with the USA in that country's efforts to contain Russia, in lecturing it on the acquis communautaire and in accusing it of using energy as a political tool.
Russia, it is clear, is ready to raise the ante. They know that despite the current bravado with regard to Georgia, the USA policymakers are hamstrung with a Presidential election in the coming weeks. They also know that the EU leadership has a unified position but that there are also cracks underneath the surface. Accordingly, Russia is stressing that its partners should choose between containment and cooperation, as it cannot be both a potential threat and a strategic partner. Consequently, Moscow astutely, on a parallel track, is using the carrot of potential cooperation in areas like - international terrorism, drug trafficking, climate change and food security.
Russia is hoping that such a policy, juxtaposed with supply of necessary energy, will enable it to continue playing its strong arm role in the countries and territories which it describes as 'near-abroad'
and within the paradigm of its sphere of influence. These include-the Baltic States (protected by NATO and EU membership but have vocal Russian minorities who claim discrimination), Poland (Moscow has said that it will target Poland with nuclear weapons after it agreed to host US missile shield through a deal signed recently), the Arctic (Russia like other nations is competing for the region's rich natural resources and aggressively asserting its territorial rights), Ukraine (volatile because of large ethnic Russian population concentrated in south and east and naval base at Sebastopol), Kazakhstan (a major oil producer with a large Russian minority where the UK and the USA have growing interests) and Kaliningrad (Moscow's Baltic fleet is based in this Russian enclave and Russia has threatened to place nuclear weapons here).
As a counter-foil to NATO efforts, Russia has also hinted that a situation has emerged when it might be necessary to discuss whether there is need to initiate a new security treaty in Europe.
It may be recalled here that, in addition to NATO, there is also another institution to resolve serious crises within Europe-the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The effectiveness of this institution has however been impaired because of US insistence that OSCE does not have any legal capacity. Several NATO and EU countries have also called into question that validity of its guiding principles as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. The Russians believe that this has created a security vacuum in Europe. Such a view is not shared by Germany but nevertheless, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has taken the initiative to suggest the convening of all sides to a pan-European Summit. According to the Russian leader, the objective of such a session could be to review outstanding security challenges from all viewpoints and to draw up a legally binding European Security Treaty.
Russia has claimed that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCC) - which represents more than 50 of the world population - has issued a communique supporting Russia's role in promoting peace and stability in the Caucasus. Some western countries have disputed this. They have pointed out that some within the SCC, particularly China and India, will always be reluctant to agree to the formation of new States through break-away steps.
However all said and done, there is a new realism with regard to Russia and that has to be taken into account by the West. F Fukuyama has correctly pointed out that the present posture of the Bush Administration reflects the balance of power that existed in the 1990s, when Russia was weak and had few cards to play. That has changed. The differences between Moscow's intervention in Chechnya in 1994 and Georgia in 2008 are dramatic in content and approach.
At the same time it would be pertinent to observe that Russia's argument that its recent military operations in Georgia were justified by the principle of "responsibility to protect" (colloquially known as R2P) does not hold up under scrutiny. I agree with Gareth Evans that Russia has not made a compelling case that the threat posed by Georgia to the South Ossetian population was of a nature and scale to legitimate the use of military force. It appears that in terms of proportionality of response, the introduction of about 20,000 Russian troops and 100 tanks into South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Georgia proper was manifestly excessive. The Russian naval blockade in the Black Sea as well as aerial bombings of Gori, Poti, the Zugdidi region and an aviatio plant in Tbilisi also went well beyond the necessary minimum.
One can only hope that both sides, the West (led by the USA) and Russia will engage in a positive dialogue. Moscow has made its point but also needs to understand that it should not isolate itself from Europe. It will be a difficult balance. Russia and the West will have to find the fine line between disapproval, pressure and continued engagement. That will be hard, but there is no other alternative. The EU under the leadership of France, also helped by the active and constructive role played by Finland (another country both Russia and Georgia accept as a player) in its capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, will have to identify the least common denominators in this regard and move forward as facilitators.
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