PERSPECTIVE
Prospects of a Resumed Dialogue between India and Pakistan
WHEN emperor Jehangir chose Lahore to be his summer retreat four hundred years ago the long stretch of Grand Trunk road between Delhi and Lahore built earlier by Sher Shah Suri was surely frequented by royal entourage and courtiers even in that distant past. Later when the transportations improved the cities must have seemed just around the corner to each-other. The partition, however, pushed them apart with check posts at Wagha and Atari slamming their doors to any regular vehicular more.
After half-a-century of self-imposed isolation, the two great cities of the subcontinent seem to be closing the distance with the opening of direct bus service between them as a result of an agreement reached between the two prime ministers, Mian Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Behari Vajpayee of India at New York last autumn.
However small the measure may appear in improving relations between the two arch-rivals it, nonetheless, speaks volumes about the prospects of a dialogue that restored in 1997 - notwithstanding its long bumpy road towards a meaningful conclusion.
A unique chemistry of Punjabi fraternity could have worked at Male SAARC summit where almost an octogenarian Prime Minister IK Gujral who fled his Pakistan home in 1947 made an extra-ordinary gesture to a fellow Punjabi Mian Nawaz Sharif, nearly half of his age by agreeing to include in the dialogue agenda, for the first time, the question of Kashmir. Earlier the items was repeatedly insisted on by the Pakistanis but routinely resisted by the Indians. The subsequent meeting of the foreign secretaries of the two countries held in Islamabad reflected this argument.
The trouble however started during the third round of the talks in New Delhi where the Indian officials wavered from their Male commitments. Because, in the meantime, both Gujral and South Block came under pressure from Indian hard-liners who refuted the idea of Kashmir - "an integral part" of the country - coming under substantive discussion. The meeting failed to make any headway as the Indians were adamant not to accept a separate working group for Kashmir. Thus the dialogue was suspended to be resumed later through mutual agreement.
The suspension became prolonged due to internal developments both in India and Pakistan including an election in India which brought in a new government headed by ultra-nationalist BJP. Although the new prime minister Vajpayee announced his intention to improve relations with the neighbours including Pakistan the tone of the Indian policy, particularly one on Kashmir was set by Hindu, militants like L K Advani and others in keeping with the party's avowedly 'activist' agenda. Things worsened with Pakistan's Ghauri missile test ostensibly as a counter to Indian deployment of the Prithvi missile along Pakistani border. Later the BJP decision to carry out a series of nuclear tests in early May, 1998 put the whole process of peace talks in doldrums. The fate of the dialogue suffered its worst at Colombo SAARC summit in July 1998 where in their first serious encounter the two prime ministers sharply differed on the modalities of the dialogue as India continued to reject the notion of separate working group for Kashmir.
Then, of course, a turning point came with the nuclear tests in both the countries and their impact on both regional and global security situation becoming a catalyst for the continuance of the dialogue. The nuclearisatoin of both India and Pakistan sparked a new anxiety for global community who readily recognised Kashmir as core issue between the two countries. And the entire world became aware of the need to resolve it on an urgent basis.
One of the reasons why Mr Vajpayee later accepted the agenda agreed in June 1997 was the world-wide pressure on Indian and Pakistan to resume their bilateral dialogue. Not only to accepted the agenda agreed earlier Mr Vajpayee also accepted Pakistan's proposal to deal exclusively with Kashmir and security issues in the first meeting in October, '98 of resumed talks. Although both India and Pakistan were obliged to carry on with the dialogue the problems started resurfacing once the meetings took place - first in Islamabad in October '98 on Kashmir and security and subsequently in New Delhi in November '98 on the rest of the issue of 8-point agenda.
Bother sides have been cautions enough this time not to term the talks failure but the gap between the two is too obvious to be hidden. Indian foreign secretary advocated an easy-to-the difficult approach implying that while discussing Kashmir they should proceed on what was 'do-able' in other areas and cautioned against front loading the process with complex and problematic issues. But Pakistan's foreign secretary had likened the process to car driving where one had to engage the first gear to move to the fourth. He also cautioned that the "simmering embers" could always burst into flames if half-hearted measures were taken to douse the flames.The subsequent meetings in New Delhi also produced mixed results at the best and remained more of ground breaking efforts. Even if the meetings so far did not produce any concrete results the dialogue seems to be on the track. Because both parties agreed to meet again in February '99. None is overly optimistic about its positive outcome; yet the exercise would be worthwhile. The nuclearisation of both India and Pakistan has added new dimension to its urgency.
Although the latest round of talks in Islamabad and its follow up in New Delhi owe largely to the US insistence - no less responsible for them was the realisation by both India and Pakistan that, after becoming overt nuclear powers, they could remain isolated from each-other only at an exorbitant cost. The dynamics of the nuclear stand-off imposes painful restrictions on the freedom of action of the countries which they earlier thought was available behind the nuclear exchange.
So, irrespective of their differences in approach on the issues of negotiation they must realise that they are at defining moment in their bilateral relations and they must find effective ways to reduce tension and avoid confrontation in the subcontinent. After crossing the nuclear Rubicon in May last year the two countries owe it to their peoples and the world community to demonstrate that they are capable of responsibly managing their nuclear relationship by devising confidence-building measures (CBMs) to avert the danger of a nuclear conflagration in the region.
India and Pakistan have possessed nuclear weapons since the late eighties but both pursued a policy of ambiguity vis-a-vis their nuclear postures. Now after 1998 nuclear tests the challenges facing the countries in how to prevent a nuclear-armed subcontinent from going to war. As both the countries are now nuclear weapon powers the objective of their military doctrine can no longer be to win a war against each-other. She prime objective should be to utilise their newly gained capabilities only as a deterrent and avoid any conflict that may escalate into a nuclear holocaust. What is needed for that is to develop a full range of nuclear, missile and conventional arms CBMs which should focus on formalising nuclear restraint, a greater understanding of each-other's nuclear doctrines, increased transparency through exchange of information and reliable and fast mode of communication.
The hard question is whether the two countries can get even into the elementaries of these requirements in the February talks - let alone the question of any breakthrough. The outsiders have been complaining that India and Pakistan are engaged in the rituals of dialogue only for the sanctions to be lifted. Because the US and western world have listed progress in the bilateral negotiations between Islamabad and New Delhi - particularly over the Kashmir issue - as an important element of their demands place before India and Pakistan. But for India and Pakistan even if friendship is not attainable in the near future, peaceful coexistence has now become an overwhelming imperative at least for their own sake.
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