Putin Faces Huge Hurdles
The resignation of Boris Yeltsin as Russia's president and the selection of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as Yeltsin's successor made a lot of people worldwide nervous, and there were several understandable reasons for the unease.
First of all, Yeltsin's resignation was both unexpected and abrupt - he had often vowed to serve until the end of his term this spring. That, combined with the Kremlin's reputation for intrigue and conspiracy, led some people to suspect (mistakenly, it now seems) that he had been ousted in a coup. Also, no one knew much about Putin, and what little they knew was ominous; he had been an agent in the Soviet KGB and later headed Russia's domestic intelligence agency. Last and maybe worst of all, Putin was an energetic champion of Russia's brutal military campaign in Chechnya.
So it was natural to fear that Russia's march toward democracy, prosperity and stability - a march that admittedly had slowed and maybe even stalled in Yeltsin's later years - might be reversed, and that the dour, mysterious and slightly suspect Putin might lead his country back toward authoritarian rule. After all, didn't Putin's support for the Chechnya war satisfy the Russian people's longing for a "strong leader" to rescue them from the poverty, chaos, corruption and criminal violence that Yeltsin's democratic reforms had brought?
And didn't Putin himself say such leadership was essential for Russia? These are all legitimate questions and concerns. I have mixed feelings about the possibility of his success. On one hand, there is convincing evidence that Putin will do his best to bring democracy, economic health and stability to Russia. He may not reach these goals, just as Yeltsin didn't. But I believe he will try. On the other hand, his attitude towards the Chechnya conflict raises serious concern. As prime minister, he used the war in Chechnya to stir nationalism at home while fueling his own political fortunes.
Putin recently outlined his own vision in a lengthy statement of political and economic philosophy called "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium". Putin's statement is not boiler-plate stuff; read in its entirety, it reflects a fairly mature understanding of the modern world and of Russia's place in it. He doesn't think Russia can or should become a democracy on the US or British model, but even less does he think it can or should become a dictatorship.
Even if Putin wanted to restore authoritarian rule in Russia, he probably couldn't. Those who might support such a move have neither the intellectual nor the political strength to turn back the clock. If last month's parliamentary elections are any indication, the political momentum in Russia is swinging in favour of those who want reform and stability. As I see it, Putin has two obstacles to overcome in his quest to make Russia a "democratic, law-based workable federative state".
First, and most daunting, is the inertia of the Russian government bureaucracy. It is a bureaucracy that is not only among the world's most corrupt; it is also among the most unbudgeable. The second obstacle is the war in Chechnya. Ironically, that war is very popular in Russia, which is why Putin's support for it has won him such praise and power in the country. But the war is popular among the ordinary Russians because they think it's been successful. If the conflict drags on, if it starts killing large numbers of Russian soldiers and if its economic costs become intolerable, the war - and Putin - may become unpopular.
Putin knows this, of course. But he may be unable to extricate himself from Chechnya, just as President Johnson in the US was unable to extricate himself from the Vietnam War. If Putin can use his extraordinary political popularity to tame the Russian bureaucracy, and if he can get Russian forces out of Chechnya on honourable terms, he may be able to do what he wants to do and what Yeltsin was unable to do: rescue Russia from its past and bring it into the modern world.
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