The Outside Story
Stretching the Limits of the Art of the Possible
What is politics, if not the art of the possible? In the Bangladesh context, the boundaries of possibilities appear to get stretched with every new shift in alliances. The current shift adds another twist, by opening up possibilities of a rapprochement between two former sworn enemies.
It was not long ago, - in fact, Sep 1, 1991 - that BNP chief and then prime minister Khaleda Zia had threatened to keep former president Hussain Muhammad Ershad in jail for the rest of his life. And it has not been too long since Ershad also has had some pretty unkind things to say about his nemesis. But political necessities appear to be bringing these two most unfriendly foes to a common platform.
In one sense, the on-going regrouping among centre-right and right-wing political forces does not represent a new polarisation. Ideologically speaking, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jatiya Party (JP) have always been in the same pole or thereabouts. But they have found it difficult to come to a common platform for various reasons.
One reason was personality clashes (Khaleda vs Ershad); another was historical (Ershad's overthrow of BNP government in 1982); yet another was tactical (JP's decision to go with the Awami League in 1994-96 in an effort to protect itself from BNP's attempt to monopolise the "nationalist" territory). But now it seems that Ershad has finally decided to make the break with the Awami League (AL) and take on the role of an opposition party.
In a way, this is music to BNP's ears because this would hasten AL's isolation and make the former's agitation plans look that much more threatening. But on the other hand, Ershad's desertion of AL may put BNP in a dilemma. The BNP would certainly like to monopolise the centre-right and right wing of the political spectrum. This job would be easier if Ershad kept JP closer to the centre by maintaining his alliance with the AL. But Ershad's right-ward move makes it a little crowded for the BNP, and puts paid to its long dream of usurping the JP's ideological mantle and vote banks.
However, it is more likely that both the BNP and JP are thinking in the short-term, that is how to remain relevant over the next 12 months. Parliament does not provide enough soundbytes or headlines to be glamorous. The streets are better, where the smell of burning tyres, sound of exploding crackers and the scolding sensation of tear gas would make them feel as if they mattered.
A movement in the run-up to elections in the year 2000 would help boost sagging morale among opposition rank and file, and focus public attention on "misdeeds" of the government. Such a movement would also help to weaken the AL's organisational structure, as the party in power would be forced to rely more on administrative means and financial inducements to maintain its authority and counter the opposition's destablising tactics.
But the AL is no novice when it comes to organising or countering street agitation. Sheikh Hasina may still have many cards up her sleeve, and she is unlikely to flinch from meeting a political challenge head-on. Destabilisation of the government may well be countered by destabilisation within the opposition camp.
For a movement to have real bite under such circumstances, the BNP would need to gather all anti-AL forces, particularly the JP, under a common programme. The stated goal of the movement may well be mid-term elections or local elections under caretaker government. But the real goal would be to corner the government during the run-up to the elections, weaken Hasina's authority and force people to conclude that the AL is unable to govern. And if the government reacts with police action and repression, that would be a bonus.
The question that remains is, can a Khaleda-led BNP and a JP headed by Ershad work out a common programme of agitation, and then follow it up with an electoral alliance. In Bangladeshi politics, room for capturing power through agitation is now virtually zero. Any political party dreaming of coming to power has to plan for the elections that would follow street movement, rather than just the agitation itself.
Therefore, the eventual impact of a BNP-JP alliance would only be significant if there are indications of an electoral alliance between the two, or possibly three including the Jamaat-e-Islami or JI. Past experiences have shown that such alliances may work wonders during agitation, but if there is no electoral pact, then the junior partner runs the risk of losing out. Both the JP and JI had such an experience in 1994-96. Their support for the Awami League's all-out campaign for elections under neutral caretaker government bore the desired fruit, but the AL walked off with the real prize in the general elections that followed, leaving both JP and JI to nurse aggrieved sentiments.
In the current scenario, it does not seem the BNP has much inclination to forge an electoral alliance. Perhaps Khaleda feels that a successful movement would propel her to electoral victory, just like it did in 1991 following the anti-Ershad movement of 1990. She may also recall that the AL too successfully surfed to victory in the 1996 polls on the wave of the caretaker movement.
However, elections are not an ideological or emotional game, and the patience of the people with agitation as a means to electoral gains may be wearing thin. For the prudent leader, elections are viewed fundamentally as a game of arithmetic. Before the BNP decides on its next course of action, Khaleda would certainly weigh up the numbers, because these may need a lot of juggling.
An evaluation of results from the past two parliamentary elections (Feb 27, 1991 and June 12, 1996) may show that electoral understanding with the JI and JP in selected constituencies could well bring in extra seats for the BNP. This is particularly true for districts outside the greater Dhaka region. But whether this sort of alliance brings the BNP an extra 50 seats or not, Khaleda also has to pay a price, in terms of letting both the JI and JP have free runs in areas where they feel they could win. So the net gain would determine whether it would make sense for the BNP to forge an electoral alliance with the JP and JI.
On the other hand, the JI cannot hope to improve upon its diabolical showing in the last elections, when it won around eight per cent of the votes and three seats, without large-scale tactical switch by BNP supporters.
On paper, the JP is in a better position. There is a slim chance it may be able to project itself as a party of moderation, and gain from the incessant bickering and violence between the AL and BNP. However, the JP needs a great deal of help in order to survive in the electoral game.
The BNP has successfully established itself as the standard-bearer of the centre-right, and the extreme right is also banking on Khaleda. But the JP still has not been able to build up a national following, and it's electoral appeal remains limited to a few pockets in the north-west and north-east.
Ershad has lost much of his lustre, and he has never managed to gain anything like the credibility that turned Hasina and Khaleda into national leaders. Besides, the party appears to be in permanent crisis, despite the healing of the rift between Ershad and former prime minister Kazi Zafar Ahmed. The factionalism that has wracked the JP over the past eight years has taken a severe turn again, with the expulsion of senior vice chairman Anwar Hossain Manju who is unlikely to take it lying down.
A great deal now depends on the course of action that Manju may take (or, may be able to take). Recent experiences do not augur things well for Manju. A breakaway party rarely does well in Bangladesh, as has been observed with K M Obaidur Rahman's "BNP" in 1990-95, Kazi Zafar's "JP" over the last couple of years, or even Dr Kamal Hossain's ill-fated attempt to launch an alternative to the AL through the Gono Forum in 1992.
If Manju decides to form a rebel JP in parliament with the support of a dozen or so MPs, then its fate in the coming elections may well hinge on AL support. What impact that might have on the JP's traditional votes is anybody's guess.
In this current state of extreme flux and uncertainty in the broad opposition camp, an alliance on a minimum anti-government agenda may be the best BNP and JP can hope for. Ershad would naturally like an alliance on equal terms with Khaleda. But if the BNP refuses to grant Ershad that honour, then the JP may have little choice but to return to a tacit understanding with the AL before the new millennium arrives.
For the AL, isolation would not be disastrous as things stand now. This is more so, because opposition demand for mid-term polls is losing credibility with every passing day. But should BNP and JP decide to boycott any major elections, such as the Upazila Parishad or city Corporation polls, then isolation may take its toll.
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