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US influence enhanced through EU enlargement
The presence of the new members will probably stop the drifting apart of the United States from its Atlantic partners, but it will also raise the question of how the EU will reorganise itself within this frame of contradiction in expectations. The next few years will be difficult. In addition to streamlining the regulatory mechanism that is in place, emphasis will have to be given also to the discovery of the least common denominators that will be required to formulate common policies.
THE recent enlargement of the European Union has created its own dynamics both within the European Union as well as in the relationship between the European countries and the United States of America. The fact that this has coincided with the entry of many former Soviet bloc countries, essentially pro-American, into NATO, is bound to also generate an increase in the United States' overall general influence in Europe and within the EU in particular.
This new development is expected to have different consequences for mainframe Europe in more ways than one. It will have its own impact on the once accepted idea of an 'emergent Germany' leading the continent from Berlin. This important change in the European scenario will also ensure, in its own way, great difficulty within the EU to define itself and its evolving foreign and security policy as being clearly independent of the United States.
The debate that has followed the expansion of the EU last month, clearly demonstrates that for policymakers in several European countries, the new members from Central and Eastern Europe, after a decade's transition from subjugation, remain existentially concerned with maintaining their national independence and identity. This connotes that the new EU members continue to consider the United States, rather than any European neighbour or the EU itself, as the principal guarantor of their infant democracies, and probably the important political reference point in creating a future that is relatively secure and prosperous. Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski has already underlined this with the statement that "there would be no Europe without American democracy". Such a view must have proved to be very sensitive for European self-esteem.
This approach may be interpreted as a desire by these new members to join an 'Euro-Atlantic' community with its own commitment to peace and stability. This is a phrase that is being used quite often now-a-days and probably reflects the mindset of these countries blending the EU and NATO increasingly together. In a manner of speaking, these countries would probably like, as a German historian has recently put it, that 'the Atlantic becomes the same widths as the Oder or Dneipr rivers'.
This may not be immediate but there is greater likelihood that after the recent steps there will be a more organic relationship between them and the US. This subtle shift in thinking appears to have been underlined in a recent blunt pro-American declaration by the so-called Vilnius Group (consisting of then former Soviet bloc countries) presenting themselves as part of a potential coalition committed with the United States to the disarming of Iraq. Such a step was indicative of the fact that these countries were subject to greater US influence as compared to many of the EU's senior member states. This in the long run is bound to affect the balance of power within the new, enlarged European Union.
This evolution is interesting because most political scientists do not appear to have anticipated in the early 1990s that the US would have such an overwhelming role within the process of European unification. It was assumed then that the newly reunited Germany, after the fall of the Soviet Union, would be the dominant beneficiary of Europe's opening to the East.
Besides the economic advantages of Berlin's proximity, it was often thought that Germany would provide political leadership for the countries emerging out of the old Soviet's 'orbit'. It was presumed that Germany would emerge as the essential political force, East and West, in all of Europe. In fact, any discussion on shifts in Europe's political centre of gravity, usually ended with Berlin. This, in turn, led countries like Netherlands, Spain and France to express guarded concern about possible German predominance in a reorganised and revitalised Europe.
However, reality appears to have worked in different ways. Instead of a resurgent Germany, the world has witnessed, for the last decade, economic stagnation of sorts in that country. There has been a vast drain of resources in the overcoming of the various infra-structural shortcomings of the communist East Germany and integrating that part within the new Germany. This has resulted in the virtual disappearance of the old West German type of high-cost, low-risk capitalism being a suitable model for development.
It is true that the German economy has remained important in matters of trade with the countries of Eastern Europe, but its power appears to have diminished overall in European and international terms.
It has also been pointed out in the recent past by some analysts that the downturn in the German economy has been accompanied by a relative lack in the increase of Germany's political reach in acting as an initiator of defender of democracy. Some have even noted that Germany has been 'less of a prime mover in opening up NATO membership to the former satellite states' and has been more interested in being a "bargainer laying down tough economic and social conditions for the individual applicants' entry into the EU." These views have led to careful scrutiny within the German establishment.
These perceptions appear to have created their own logic. With the entry of additional members from Central and East Europe, so reliant on the United States, it is now generally agreed that it will be that much more difficult for France or Germany to create a global force within an expanded EU that could be a counter-balance for the United States. The new scenario is dictating a scale-down of European aspirations. Reality is now settling in.
Jacques Delors, the former President of the European Commission, is now referring to a Europe, 'whose ambition is to be influential'. This mildness compares greatly with earlier French concepts of Europe being a competitor for world political power.
In the recent past, one has seen how some of the European countries have tried to demonstrate to the rest of the world their belief in principles of international law. They have to some extent been successful in reaffirming the importance of multilateral action as opposed to unilateral response. However, the impact of united, expanded Europe has not always been evident. This probably has been one of the downsides of being an extended geo-political entity which is subject to pressures and pulls from different angles.
Nevertheless, despite some difficulties in the short run, there will be, I believe, a gradual growth of greater understanding on complicated international issues within the expanded European Union.
One tender to agree with F. Pflueger, the foreign policy spokesman of the Christian Democrat grouping in the German Parliament, that in some areas related to security, within the EU, 'influence of the United States will be fostered by the Central and East European countries which look more to the US than to the original members of the EU'. However, there are questions pertaining to sustainable development subsidy in general and agriculture in particular, environment and other areas of competing and varied interests. It is in these sectors that greater European unity will probably surface in the longer run.
The equation has altered inexorably in Europe and the USA is more of a ball player in this new matrix. The older members of the European Union will have to acknowledge this and ponder on how to create a better pecking order and unity among diversity.
They will also have to agree on a fresh strategy on issues that will require balance in terms of priorities and interests within the context of a unipolar world order dominated by the United States, their principal competitor.
As has been exemplified in recent years, Europe will have its own economic and trade agenda. Conflict of political wills might have a special bearing here. Some of the new EU member states from Central and Western Europe will definitely act as bridges between Europe and the United States. This will be of special importance for both sides of the Atlantic and also for countries from the developing world.
The presence of the new members will probably stop the drifting apart of the United States from its Atlantic partners, but it will also raise the question of how the EU will reorganise itself within this frame of contradiction in expectations. The next few years will be difficult. In addition to streamlining the regulatory mechanism that is in place, emphasis will have to be given also to the discovery of the least common denominators that will be required to formulate common policies.
Muhammad Zamir is a former Ambassador. For any response please contact mzamir@dhaka.net
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