Iran walking a tight rope

The West's mistrust of Iran came to a boil on 24 September with the UN watchdog agency IAEA approving a EU sponsored resolution that could eventually lead to Iran's referral to the United Nations Security Council for violating the nuclear arms control treaty. The Resolution was adopted with 22 of the 35 members of the Board of Governors supporting it, 12 abstaining (which included Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Sri Lanka and Pakistan) and one opposing it. The European Union had proposed the Resolution and tried very hard to have it adopted by consensus. Their efforts however failed in the face of opposition from certain non-aligned States.

The surprise in the pack was India. Its support for the EU Resolution came in for serious rebuke from many of India's domestic political parties. The CPI (M) which recognises Iran's right to develop its nuclear technology under international safeguards was particularly critical. Yashwant Sinha, former Foreign Minister and one of the leaders of the main opposition Hindu nationalist BJP party also alleged that India had buckled in under intense US and British pressure. Despite such criticism, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's comment articulated the reasons for the vote rather well 'it was a considered decision keeping the country's national interests in mind' (AFP). Most observers feel that India's decision was dictated by its own relations with the US and her need for nuclear collaboration with that country. By her action, India signalled, as aptly described by Kuldip Nayar, that it was willing to ride two horses at the same time. I am referring here to Indian interest to receive Iranian gas from 2009.

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China, as usual, was cautious. Consistent with its recognised need for energy and its growing strategic friendship with Iran, it urged that it believed in using diplomatic means within the framework of the IAEA to resolve the contentious issue. It also underlined that serious efforts need to be undertaken by the EU and Iran to maintain peace and stability in the region. In this context, it urged greater political will and flexibility so that the interests and concerns of both sides can be carefully examined.

China and Russia's abstentions indicated their anxiety that adoption of such a Resolution might be the first step towards eventual referral to the UN Security Council, trade sanctions and even a ban on oil sales. Their vote clarified their concern that economic interests of both countries were at stake. It also underlined that China was no longer prepared to allow its energy factor being undermined in Iran as had already happened earlier in Iraq.

Russia's decision also exhibited its unwillingness to take on extra pressure over its assistance to Iran in the construction of the light water reactor at Bushehr. It may be recalled that this is nearing completion and Russia is supposed to supply nuclear fuel needed to run it. Such cooperation is however vehemently opposed by the USA which claims that oil-rich Iran does not require nuclear power. The Russians, to their credit, have staunchly defended their action by pointing out that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon states. Iran has upheld this view and has argued that nuclear technology for civilian use is within its rights as a Sate.

Russia, at the same time, has however taken out some insurance for its pro-Iran stance. It has suggested on 3 October that 'in the interests of normalising the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear programme, Tehran should continue active cooperation with the IAEA'. For obvious reasons it is hedging its bets and trying to keep the EU and the US happy. They need to do this given the fact that their military-industrial complex are expecting to clinch several arms sales deals with Iran. They are worried that a future UN Security Council Resolution advocating sanction against Iran, because of IAEA, might end their chances of multi-billion dollar contracts and affect both political as well as economic interests.

In any case, the IAEA Resolution represents a victory for Washington and the EU. IAEA chief Mohammed EIBaradei might have indicated that there is still room for diplomacy and that there was no question of referring Iran to the UN Security Council before November, but for all practical purposes the bell has rung.

President Ahmadinejad of Iran in an interview with 'Time' magazine has significantly observed that 'everyone is aware that what is happening to Iran (over the nuclear issue) is totally politics.' He has described the whole current IAEA process as a political posture. He has also pointed out that Iran's supreme religious leader has already issued a Fatwa forbidding the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. He has in addition commented that after such a Fatwa 'nobody can go in that direction anymore.' The Iranian government has also stated that Iran has had more than 1200 man-days of inspections and that monitoring cameras are everywhere in their facilities.

The question that arises at this point is why are the EU and the USA so concerned? Is it mere non-proliferation or is it anxiety over Iran assuming a more dominating role within a region where Shia clerics are determining policy? A nuclear Iran, it is being felt, might greatly influence the emerging Shia leadership in Iraq. There are also fears that the equation might also change vis-a-vis Syria and Israel.

It appears that American and EU anxiety reached alarm status after discovery in mid-2002 of two other secret Iranian nuclear facilities -- a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant near Arak. The US believes that these facilities can, not only contribute to Iran's development of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, but also enable them to build nuclear weapons without importing nuclear material. The fact that Iran has not as yet agreed to sign the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, and has now shown that it can build centrifuges' have clearly contributed to such worry.

The stakes have also acquired significant dimensions because Iran has already demonstrated that it possesses a large missile inventory. It has not only acquired complete missile systems but also developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously.

It has bought North Korean Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs and Nodong ballistic missiles. It has also developed short-range artillery rockets and has already flight tested indigenously built intermediate range missiles. Iran has explained that its interest in such armoury has largely been because of perceived instability in the region -- interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and establishment of US bases in the Central Asian region. The Iranians feel encircled and have started taking precautionary strategic steps.

The recent refusal by President Bush to rule out any option in dealing with Iran has also created its own dynamics. The British Foreign Secretary has tried to calm the waters by starting that military action against Iran is 'inconceivable'. This will however not reduce international apprehension. Neither will it persuade Iran to be more compliant between now and the publication of the IAEA report in November, despite the IAEA and its Chief EIBaradei receiving the Nobel Prize for peace.

Both EU and the USA need to remember that they are now inter-acting with a new President who is known for his conservative opinions. It will hardly help matters by pushing him into a corner and reducing his options of flexibility. He is an elected President and not a dictator who unleashed wars against his neighbours and chemical weapons on his countrymen.

The next few months will be critical in the coalition's exercise of restoring a semblance of democracy in united Iraq and fostering democratic traditions in Afghanistan. That should receive priority over everything else.

Iran will be another distraction that both the USA and the European Union can do without.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador -- any response to mzamir@ dhaka.net