Understanding the riots in France
Undeniably, the unrest among the North African and other minorities in France was rooted in decades long socio-economic exclusion of the minorities by the successive French governments, though the initial spark was provided by the accidental electrocution of two Muslim teenagers fleeing from the police on October 27.
Social neglect meant denial to the Muslim minority by the majority community of equal recognition as French citizens. Economic neglect mostly in the form of unemployment meant denial of opportunity to the minorities for vertical socio-economic movement in French society. Migrants were regarded as rootless short-term utility maximisers, unfit for assimilation into French society with French values, thus denying them the inherent elements of multiculturalism.
Though historically assimilation has been viewed in coercive terms, France was till recently portrayed as a country practicing a liberal agenda, distinct in varying degrees, from other European countries. France's repeated attempts to embrace multiculturalism, now being torn to shreds, were not only to resist class-based theory of race relations embraced by xenophobic politicians but also to honour the series of agreements reached between the European Union and the Arab League that guaranteed the Muslim population in Europe would not be forced to adapt to the customs of the host countries.
Professor John Crowley (of the University of Paris-Dauphin) summarises the class-based race relationship paradigm as containing some of the following elements: the most fundamental relations in modern society are those of economic class; immigration is determined by the economic requirements of advanced metropolitan capitalism; and migrants invariably belong to the working class.
France did not restrict immigration from North Africa and other African countries because they were willing to do dirty and dangerous works which white French citizens refused to do. Besides, these immigrants were largely invisible as they resided in shantytowns at the periphery of the large cities and their presence was also generally ignored in public and political debates. But the slum clearance decision of the French government brought the immigrants into the residential mainstream and the oil shock of the seventies brought into focus the efficacy of the contribution of the minorities to the French economy.
As the debate on immigration policy gathered momentum, the French Right politicised xenophobia against the immigrants while the French Left argued for the cultural independence of the immigrants. Chirac government's attempts to reform the nationality law that provides citizenship at the age of 18 to foreigners born in France foundered in the face of opposition by liberals and immigrants. The ongoing riots appear to have hardened the French government's attitude exemplified by Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy's threat to expel from France foreigners caught rioting.
European media have started to reflect the hardened attitude against the Muslims in particular, which had remained submerged for years. One prominent commentator has observed that "among a generation of Muslims born in Europe, a significant number have nothing but contempt and disdain for their native lands and have allegiance only to the Muslim ummah and the lands of their parents."
He strongly criticises the Arab European League for rejecting any idea of assimilation or integration into European society and the AEL founder Abu Jahjah for terming assimilation as "cultural rape." Europeans are concerned that France's Muslim population estimated at five million -- the largest in Western Europe -- could be the precursor of enacting "the nightmare of permanent conflict" replacing "the sweet dream of universal cultural compatibility."
Given the fear that French Muslims could be a constitutive element of "permanent conflict" it may be useful to find out their number. As the French law does not allow census of religious adherents, the Muslim population is variously estimated to be 5 to 6 million or even 8 million, as opposed to the number of European Muslims at 12 to 20 million.
But a survey conducted by the Instut Francais de l'Opinion Public found that 36 percent described themselves as observant believers, 20 percent claimed to attend Friday prayer, and 70 percent as observed Ramadan. The Instut found one million Muslims with no strong religious or cultural ties with Islam. Paradoxically, while the first generation of Muslims was not seen as immigrants either by the government or their employers or even by themselves, the second generation, mostly born in France, and as such being French citizens with little bond with the country of origin, often feel like immigrants.
But then it would be an over-simplification to describe all second generation Muslims as embittered and discriminated because there are non-religious and atheist individuals of Muslim extraction. The question to be faced is whether those denied the opportunity to better themselves and often victims of police harassment after 9/11 can be brought back into the fold of national cohesiveness or "societal security" to use the term of Danish sociologist Ole Waever.
One school of thought would like everyone to believe that the chasm between European nativism and immigrant dissidence is so wide that the immigrants' unwavering conviction in their interpretation of their faith far outweighs the material benefits that the western society can offer them. Both Jean-Marie Pen's Front National and Bruno Vergret's Mouvement National Republican claim that the large number of immigrants with non-European cultural background will destabilise France.
Their argument found new strength from the commotion centring on wearing of Hejab (head scarf) in France. Traditional Muslims argue that the ban on wearing Hejab is a form of religious discrimination and an attempt to impose secular values on Muslims. The French government position was that wearing Hejab constituted display of "ostentatious" sign of religious expression and is incompatible with laicite (undenominational character of schools). Finally, the French parliament forbade the display of "ostentatious" signs of religion but allowed wearing of discreet symbols of faith.
The adherents of this school of thought believe that thanks to the spread of radical Islam amongst the descendants of the Muslim immigrants invited to come to Europe to shore up the European economies after the Second World War, the Jihadist network now spans from Poland to Portugal. Citing the murder of Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam by a Dutch national of Moroccan extraction, they blame the inability of the European governments to regulate the entry of immigrants and also for their utopian dream of a multicultural society of diverse communities living in harmony, "offering oppressed nationalities marked compassion and remedial benefits" for the vandalism, delinquency, and crime stemming from Muslim immigrant enclaves throughout Europe.
Many influential Europeans including Oliver Roy, a top adviser to President Chirac, are increasingly taking the position against "appeasement" of radical Muslims, seen by them in the refusal by the Amsterdam City Council to ban the book, The Way of the Muslims, preaching radical philosophy against the grains of liberal values, on the ground that the ban on the book would contravene the principle of the freedom of expression. Many Europeans are now convinced that the French riots have amply demonstrated the failure of multi-culturalist philosophy that a country can absorb a population holding vastly different values from those held by the host population without negative consequences to both the parties.
They differ with the oft-peddled sociological view that socio-economic differences between the Muslim disadvantaged groups and the mainstream European society can account for the explosion now happening in Europe and challenge the "apologists" to look for the reasons for the lack of socio-economic advancement in the internal function of the group itself. They argue that the root cause of Muslim rage against the Judeo-Christian civilisation is their inerrant belief that the Muslims are already in possession of the final revealed truth, leading to an inherently superior way of life, inhibiting adaptation to a technically more advanced society.
In fine, if the European Muslims, suffering from identity crisis, express their discontent through apocalyptic nihilism then they would be expediting the process of "spiraling progressive alienation" from the mainstream Western society. Madrid and London bombings and Van Gogh killing have strengthened the hands of the European politicians in their demands that their citizens master "Britishness"(in the case of the UK), or adopt "Dutch values" (in Holland) or accept laicite (in French schools). The Muslims who inhabit the developing and the least developing parts of the world and are heavily dependant on Western money and market should not put at stake their economic and technological advancement for the sake of a radical group of people who believe in a return to seventh century Arabia.
The responsibility for extinguishing the fire ignited by the Islamists, partly due to Western negligence typical of metropolitan-periphery relationship, lies equally with both. The challenge is immediate and immense. A word of caution to the Islamic world would be in order: but for the finite energy resources the non-Muslim world can do without the Muslims (one only has to look at the volume of interaction among the developed and the non-Muslim emerging economies), but the Muslim world cannot do without them. For the sake of a stable and prosperous world, both sides have no other option but to cooperate with one another.
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