Plain Words
Crises in and around Pakistan
PAKISTAN'S new President, Asif Ali Zardari, went to Washington and negotiated at high levels with the American administration in his own inimitable style. His immediate purposes were, of necessity, twofold: First, the Pakistan economy is in dire straits. Specifically, its current account deficit is deep in the red, and Pakistan will soon have to pay out something like $14 billion, mainly the differences between imports and exports.
This is a crippling circumstance, especially when all other macroeconomic indicators are pointing downward. It is becoming very hard for Pakistan to raise enough money on its own to balance the books. Unless it is helped by major powers, it cannot avoid default a couple of months down the line.
The second crisis that was his immediate worry: it was the repeated American military action on Pakistan's soil. There was an uproar in the country, and the army chief ordered the Pakistan army to fire on intruding soldiers.
There is also the controversial matter of American aerial raids on the Frontier's tribal areas. Former foreign minister Khurshid Qasuri has now disclosed that there indeed was an understanding with the US of a quick raid if it had precise and actionable intelligence.
This was seen to be in contradiction to what the army chief had said. The understanding with the US probably comprised an informal permission, denoted by the phrase "a wink and nod." Given the sentiment of Pakistanis, American military action on Pakistani soil would cause an escalation in what is actually a raging insurgency against Pakistan.
If, as can be feared, there is escalation in the operations from Taliban, al-Qaeda and various other Islamic militant groups, in consonance with the sentiments of the area, the Americans will have to extend and intensify their own operations in at least Afghanistan, and maybe also in Pakistan.
The fear is that this can become an unstoppable extension and aggravation of the war inside Pakistan. It can cause a firestorm, the flames of which may not remain confined to Pakistan.
The Zardari mission was to earnestly request Bush and the rest of the US administration to please desist from putting American boots on Pakistan's soil. What is the result?
There is no obfuscation: the Bush administration has, point blank, refused to concede the main point. Instead, Bush said that the Pakistan president has emphasised his country's sovereignty and his people's sentiment in "strong language." And that was all that Bush said.
America's Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, has, in various speeches, clearly and unmistakably said that the Americans will do what they think is necessary. He also adumbrated a not so new doctrine: The US has the right to hit any target, within any other sovereign state's territory, that it thinks poses a threat to US security or interests.
The two hopefuls for the US presidency have said in war-like language that what is necessary will have to be done, though it can be said that the Republican candidate McCain is somewhat softer in approach toward Pakistan than the Democrat Barack Obama. Thus, the American administration's policy stays traditional, using both carrot and stick.
The Pentagon and its chief are the stick part. The carrot part is the State Department. The latter emphasises traditional friendship, the desire for a long-term engagement and the cementing of the strategic alliance. The State Department says America is ready to do all it finds necessary to help Pakistan economically.
Americans led in part a new conference called Friends of Pakistan, that comprises the G8 and China, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The conference has promised to help. The promises are bagful. Negotiations impend and the terms would, it is feared, largely be those of IMF and World Bank.
The real American message has been made plain; that Pakistan can expect a great deal of help if it prosecutes the War on Terror in the manner America wishes it to adopt, and secondly if it continues with deregulation as the economic paradigm. Thus, attractive promises have been made.
Very clear threats have been articulated, not merely implied or hinted. Now what will Pakistan do? The test of the compliance, from the hard American viewpoint, is when Pakistan will let the American troops enter Pakistan, probably in the shape of trilateral patrols operating on both sides of the Durand Line. A trilateral command may be created with US, ISAF-Nato and Pakistan troops, to be commanded by Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, to operate in both countries.
It goes without saying that America will continue to bomb from the air as it is already doing, and a way is being suggested, so far as rumours go, for making American boots on Pakistani ground more acceptable by Pakistani soldiers being present in each raid.
If so, it is now for Islamabad to decide whether to fall in line with American wishes fairly quickly, if the economic crisis has to be resolved with western help and its own wishes. Islamabad's wishes on economic salvation are what the Americans would like, and the Pakistan army is already fighting Taliban and other militant groups in NWFP's tribal areas, with which the Americans are quite happy.
Pakistan, however, remains split. There is an old fault-line between the civilian politicians and the military high command over tribal areas of the Frontier. This time round, the new army chief adopted a tough nationalistic line for PR purposes: he said his line was in accordance with the agreed terms of engagement.
The Americans are not entitled to send their soldiers inside Pakistan to take any military action. He had, in fact, ordered his subordinates down the line to expel any foreigner trying to violate Pakistan's sovereignty by trespassing. This was acted upon -- twice. The Americans, no doubt, got the message: But the Foreign Office deployed a former foreign minister, Khurshid Qasuri, to say there indeed was an understanding with the Americans to permit, perhaps, a short, swift action by their soldiers if they had precise actionable intelligence.
Does that resolve the contradiction between the US high command and General Kayani? Will Pak-US relations go back to the traditional agreements on all issues?
For one thing, Qasuri's statement was ambiguous, and it left much unsaid. What precisely the US may have been told in confidence is of course not known. But the general wishes of the US are clear, and they have so far been holding out on the economic bailout until Pakistan agrees to all their terms.
Pakistan has first to overcome its internal differences because the civilian part of the government, one supposes, is inclined to rather speedily agree to an accommodation with the Americans with or without a face-saving formula. But the difficulty is the stand taken by General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.
He has expressed the national sentiment and is becoming popular, while the Zardari-led government looks wobbly. The longer-term political effect of such a perception is troubling.
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