Plain Words
Compulsion or choice?
IT is a moment of danger. The Pakistan economy is faced with a default on its external liabilities, both in the short run and until the first quarter of the next calendar year.
The deficits are too great to bear, particularly on the trading account, which has put heavy pressure on the balance of payments. The finance minister and other finance officials are putting on a brave front that they can pay their way through the year. But it would be a miracle if they do without substantial cash aid on harsh terms from international financial institutions.
Pakistan is trying to fish in three separate waters. It began with tapping western sources, and President Zardari assembled a Friends of Pakistan Conference in New York during the current session of the UN General Assembly.
But, against the background of the US's displeasure over Pakistan's inability to comply with American wishes vis-à-vis the fight against terror, it is sure to be hard going. The IMF and World Bank cannot possibly say "no" if Pakistan is ready to make the policy adjustments they prescribe.
Friends of Pakistan will meet in Abu Dhabi and something will be worked out from the Gulf Arabs -- and the IFIs. That is the basis of the confidence of the Pakistani officials.
The Pakistan foreign office decided to send its national security advisor to Delhi -- virtually simultaneously with President Zardari's first "official" visit to Beijing. Pakistan is angling for a friendly India that can help solve its domestic problems, particularly relieving the pressure in the tribal areas of NWFP and in Balochistan.
Pakistani intelligence services believe that it has aggravated the situation in tribal areas and Balochistan and, because of what Pakistani spooks are said to have been doing in Afghanistan, there are no great expectations from India at this stage; only a reduction in tension and resumption of dialogue are desired.
This would please the West also. Pakistan is now prepared to pay more or less the requisite price if India were to settle a few disputes.
The major disputes -- regarding Kashmir and Indus river waters, particularly the Chenab river waters -- not likely to be resolved. But a better climate can be created by the resolution of minor disputes, in which trade and some economic cooperation can be subsumed.
Some kind of a deal with India should strengthen Pakistan's hands, both in Beijing and in Washington, not to say Arab capitals. All Arabs are on the same wavelength as Washington; they all desire better Indo-Pakistan relations.
As for China, the third waters, the history of Pakistan-China relations has been one of Platonic love, mainly from the Chinese side; Pakistan's total contribution to China lie in two services it has rendered to China: there was the 1963 border agreement with China in which, according to the Indian stand, Pakistan gifted away some J and K territory that it should have retained as its own, even if it did not recognise India's right on it.
The second service that Pakistan rendered to China was no great service. It was to enable Kissinger to secretly visit Beijing from Pakistan. The groundwork for that had been laid by American diplomacy previously, and this was just a minor step; there are no reports that Pakistan had played any part in the developments that led to the visit.
The question is; why has China invested so much money and effort in Pakistan when it has not benefited China? Chinese advice was never taken by Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, and China has been vainly urging some kind of non-alignment and self-reliance in economic development. Instead, Pakistan has blindly followed the economic line given by the IFIs, and politically it has remained closely aligned with America. Pakistan's conduct from Afghanistan's Saur Revolution onward is instructive: it has danced to the tune that the West wanted it to.
Why has China stayed steadfast and gone on investing in Pakistan? It has built the Gwadar port and the Karakoram Highway; it has given Pakistan all the defence industries it has. The question needs probing.
China has invested in Pakistan for its own sake, assessing that India and Pakistan are likely to remain at odds, and are unlikely to make up anytime soon. Building up Pakistan's military strength was perceived as working to China's advantage. How? It is simple, classical balance of power. A stronger Pakistan would detract something from India's greatness as it would mean the latter earmarking a certain proportion of its military strength to offset Pakistan's.
This bottling up of a considerable portion of the Indian military for tackling Pakistan is what would leave China more or less alone in spreading its influence abroad. This does not hurt America, and the two have continued to give considerable military aid to Pakistan for exactly the same reasons -- until now, when the American attitude is changing rapidly to absorb India in its own web of power to dilute its old reliance on Pakistan.
Pakistan today faces one certainty: American is prepared to continue with economic aid but will certainly reduce its military aid. Even the continuation of economic aid would be predicated on America's success in stabilising the worldwide financial crisis and putting it again on to a path of a steady growth. For the rest, there are far too many uncertainties in Pakistan-American relations.
It is also a historic moment. One element of semi-certainty has entered: India is likely to remain aligned with the US in the immediate future, except in the unlikely event of the Indian Left defeating both Congress and BJP next year. But this may involve political turmoil inside India.
There are also uncertainties over Naxalites: they can keep a lot of India's security forces tied down for a long time. One cannot say that India will, or will not, have the requisite statesmanship in a rapidly changing world where American supremacy is decreasing at a much faster rate than anyone had supposed.
Can India and Pakistan possibly acquire the flexibility that is being forced on both by external circumstances? A theoretical possibility is that the two, if they can possibly reconcile with each other and proceed to make Saarc a vital and progressive organisation, can become agents of stability that can easily coordinate in economic matters with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
A peaceful coexistence of India and China in Asia is needed by all South Asian states. There is one thing sure however: China's politics do not permit military adventurism. It is the duty of most Asians to ensure that India and China coexist and cooperate peacefully, particularly in economic matters. Politically, they should focus closely on human rights and peaceful cooperation, without forgetting to include Japan.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel.
Comments